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The Parametrized Probabilistic Finite State
Transducer Probe Game Player Fingerprint Model
Jeffrey Tsang, Student Member, IEEE
Abstract—Fingerprinting operators generate functional sig-
natures of game players and are useful for their automated
analysis independent of representation or encoding. The theory
for a fingerprinting operator which returns the length-weighted
probability of a given move-pair occurring from playing the
investigated agent against a general parametrized probabilistic
finite state transducer (PFT) is developed, applicable to arbitrary
iterated games. Results for the distinguishing power of the 1-
state opponent model, uniform approximability of fingerprints
of arbitrary players, analyticity and Lipschitz continuity of
fingerprints for logically possible players, and equicontinuity
of the fingerprints of bounded-state probabilistic transducers
are derived. Algorithms for the efficient computation of special
instances are given; the shortcomings of a previous model, strictly
generalized here from a simple projection of the new model,
are explained in terms of regularity condition violations, and
the extra power and functional niceness of the new fingerprints
demonstrated. The 2-state deterministic finite state transducers
(DFTs) are fingerprinted and pairwise distances computed; using
this the structure of DFTs in strategy space is elucidated.
Index Terms—Automated analysis, combinatorial mathematics,
game theory, stochastic automata
I. INTRODUCTION
GAME theory is the study of the interaction of multipleagents via their selection from a palette of moves.
A simple, easily understood model, games are one of the
most common tools in understanding any sort of interaction,
whether sociological or psychological [1], economical [2], to
biological [3]. Approaches vary from mathematical concepts
such as Nash equilibria [4], computational methods such as
population dynamics simulations [5], down to experimental
testing of hypotheses drawn from analysis [6].
As an example, “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, one of the most
famous two-move games, is used to model a wide variety of
non-cooperative behaviors, finding applications as diverse as
viral evolution [7], entrepreneur-venture capitalist relations [8]
and international politics [9]. More generally, the payoff matrix
for a two-move game can be varied, and the different sets of
inequalities it satisfies govern which name it receives: another
one is “Chicken”, also considered in [9].
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Iterated games, where the same choice is given to players
multiple times, give rise to possibilities for responses to oppo-
nent’s strategies and practically unlimited complexities. This
lends itself naturally to the use of evolutionary algorithms for
simulating populations of mutually interacting agents, varying
all aspects of the conditions: this is the field of evolutionary
game theory [10]. From there insights into complicated phe-
nomena including learning [11] and biological evolution [5]
can be obtained.
Evolutionary algorithms typically generate a vast number
of different agents in a short time, and it is problematic to
try and analyze individual agents for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, most representations are capable of encoding the same
playing strategy in many ways, requiring extra effort to remove
duplicates. Secondly, evolved strategies are usually highly
complex, even if only from mutational drift about a central
strategy and not true intricacy. Lastly, any analysis technique
that works only on one representation is inherently tied to all
of its biases and emphases on particular behaviors, and cannot
be used for any cross-representational study. One method of
solving this issue is to simplify the encoding to reduce the
complexity, removing the chance of encountering interesting
strategies in the process, and this is still but one choice of
representation.
In [12] the notion of a fingerprinting operator is introduced:
a representation-independent method of reducing a player’s
strategy into a functional form, whence standard analysis
techniques can be applied [13], [14], [15]. Past applications
include analysis of representational sensitivity [16], [17] and
the effect of time and population size [18]. However, there
are issues with using the expected score, such as possible
discontinuity in fingerprints of non-finite state strategies [12],
indistinguishability of very different strategies [14], and limi-
tation to working with simultaneous two-player games.
This paper presents a general model for fingerprinting any
iterated game, applicable to asymmetric or non-simultaneous
games and also extensible to imperfect information or noisy
games. It is developed in terms of a weighted sum over
all move histories when the given player plays against a
completely parametrized probabilistic finite state transducer
representing the other players in the game. Free parameters
include the number of states and the distribution over move
lengths to consider, and can be reduced to the prior model
with appropriate choices and projections.
Functional properties of the fingerprints are derived, in-
cluding necessary and sufficient conditions for players to
1943–068X/$26.00 c©2010 IEEE
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be indistinguishable, uniform convergence of approximations,
analyticity and Lipschitz continuity for fingerprints of all
players that are consistent with the laws of probability and
equicontinuity for the entire set of bounded-state probabilistic
finite state transducers. The issues in the prior model are
explained here as problems with their implicit choice of
length distribution, namely that the expected value is zero
everywhere. Algorithms for the computation of specific cases
are developed, which permit the rapid analysis of agents
including identification and classification.
The theoretical results in this paper prove various properties
of this general fingerprinting model; to do so rigorously,
machinery from many different fields is required. Readers
unfamiliar with the fundamentals of the following areas are
invited to consult the references given therewith: automaton
theory [19], [20]; game theory [4]; probability or measure
theory [21], [22]; linear algebra with emphasis on Markov
chains [23], [24]; real analysis up to function classes and
multivariate Taylor series [25], [26].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
gives notation and preliminary definitions, Section III gives the
definition of the fingerprint operator as well as two lemmas,
and Section IV proves various properties of the operator.
Example algorithms and computations for Prisoner’s Dilemma,
a listing of basic strategies and comparison with prior work are
in Section V, while an application to discovering the structure
of the space of 2-state deterministic automata, with algorithms,
is presented in Section VI. Conclusions, future directions for
extension, improvement and application are given in Section
VII.
II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Notation: Denote the set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . . }
by N, by N∗ the set of positive integers {1, 2, 3, . . . }, by Zn
the set of natural numbers less than n {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1},
by Z∗n the positive integers less than n {1, 2, 3, . . . , n − 1};
unless explicitly stated no reference to modular arithmetic is
implied. Denote the reals by R, the powerset operator as P,
and the characteristic or indicator function of a set S by
χS : U→ R, χS(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ S,
0 if x 6∈ S
where U is the universe under consideration. For an alphabet
Σ, denote the set of all nonempty strings over Σ by
Σ+ =
∞⋃
n=1
Σn.
Denote also the set of all nonempty strings over Σ of length
at most k by
Σ[k] =
k⋃
n=1
Σn.
Definition 1: Let S be a nonempty set, and define ∆(S) to
be the space of categorical distributions supported on subsets
of S:
∆(S) =
{
v : S → R | v(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s∈S
v(s) = 1
}
A v ∈ ∆(S) represents the probability mass function of a
random variable with state space S. For infinite sets S this
may have to be a generalized function; for a finite set S of
cardinality n, this can be identified with the right n−1-simplex
in n dimensions. For s ∈ S, v ∈ ∆(S), denote by vs the s-th
component of v, v(s). As an example of this, consider S = Z2,
which gives
∆(Z2) = {(x0, x1) ∈ R2 | x0, x1 ≥ 0, x0 + x1 = 1}
using vector instead of functional notation. This is just the line
segment from (0, 1) to (1, 0): for now we will, after scaling
and rotation, identify it with the interval [0, 1].
Recall both the definitions for a probabilistic finite automa-
ton and a finite state transducer, and combine them.
Definition 2: A probabilistic finite state transducer (PFT)
is a 5-tuple (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, q0), where
• Q is a finite nonempty set of states,
• Σ is a finite nonempty input alphabet,
• Γ is a finite nonempty output alphabet,
• δ : Q×Σ→ ∆(Q× Γ) is the transition/output function,
• q0 ∈ ∆(Q× Γ) is the initial state/output.
Remembering that for probabilistic machines, everything is in
terms of stochastic vectors, or distributions.
Note that we will mostly be working with single-state PFTs
(or P1STs) whence the transition part of the function is moot.
Also there is the non-standard addition of an initial output
with no input seen at all: this will allow a PFT player who
has to play blind to start.
Definition 3: An iterated two-player perfect information
game is one where there are two abstract players P1 and P2,
and in each round of the game, P1 chooses an abstract move
from the finite nonempty moveset Γ1, and P2 chooses from
the moveset Γ2. There is no restriction on whether the plays
are simultaneous, but each player knows unambiguously their
opponent’s past moves. We refer to a game as the pair (Γ1,Γ2),
and define G1 = |Γ1| , G2 = |Γ2|.
Although here we have only two players, consider a fixed-
order n-player game, Pi having moveset Γi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and the turn order is fixed. Consider the point of view of a
distinguished P1 (who is not necessarily the first player in the
order), disregarding the special cases of the first and last move
which require simple modifications. The new information
available to P1 on their next turn includes the current moves
played by all Pi before P1 in the turn sequence, as well
as the rest of the opponents’ last moves - exactly one from
each opponent. Therefore, P1 while playing sees but a single
“opponent” whose moveset is all n−1-tuples of moves of all
the other players:
Γ
′
2 =
n∏
i=2
Γi.
Since we are going to analyze single players who are all in the
same position in the game, henceforth we only consider two
player games. Lastly, we define a representation-independent
characterization of a player.
Definition 4: Let P be a player with moveset Γ1 in the
game (Γ1,Γ2). Define the specification of P as the function
ρP : (Γ1 × Γ2)+ → [0, 1]
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ρP (w, z) = Pr(P plays w | opponent plays z),
the probability that at each round of the game, P plays the
corresponding move in w, given that over the entire course of
the game the opponent has played the move string z.
We consider players to be completely specified by their
response probabilities to each possible history of moves.
Another interpretation, supposing the player P is a PFT, is
that ρP (w, z) is the probability the machine outputs w given
the input string z.
III. DEFINITIONS AND LEMMAS
Definition 5: Given the number of states k ∈ N∗ and a
length distribution µ ∈ ∆(N∗), the parametrized PFT probe
fingerprint operator for the game (Γ1,Γ2) is defined as
F : P → (Mk → ∆(Γ1 × Γ2))
where P is the space of all players in said game that are given
moveset Γ1, and Mk is the space of all possible parameters
for a general k-state PFT with input and output alphabets Γ1
and Γ2 respectively. Labelling the states as Q, that gives
M|Q| = ∆(Q× Γ2)×∆(Q× Γ2)|Q×Γ1|
where the first term specifies the initial state/output q0, then
the transition/output function δ. Denote by FP the function
output by the operator: FP = F(P ). For ~v ∈Mk denote the
PFT constructed with those parameters as Ok(~v); the function
is defined as
FP (~v)m1m2 =
∞∑
n=1
µ(n)
∑
(w,z)∈(Γ1×Γ2)n
w ends with m1
z ends with m2
ρOk(~v)(z, w)ρP (w, z).
The interpretation is that the product of ρs is the two-way
probability that both players in the game play as dictated by the
move sequence (w, z), weighting the entire set of sequences of
length n by µ(n), and finding the grand weighted probability
that the move-pair m1m2 occurs. To see this is well defined,
the sum of all components of the fingerprint is a triple sum
over entire probability distributions (P must play a sequence,
similarly for Ok(~v) and µ) and hence equals 1.
For a given ~v ∈ Mk, denote by r∅q1m2 the probability
of playing m2 initially and starting in state q1, and rkm1m2
the probability, from state k of playing m2 having seen m1
as input. For 1-state machines we drop the state subscript.
We now have two conditions on µ which will come in as
hypotheses in the theorems.
Definition 6: Call µ ∈ ∆(N∗) nonvanishing if
∀n ∈ N∗, µ(n) 6= 0,
that is, it assigns positive weight to every length, and call µ
regular if
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
µ(i) = 1,
that is the partial sums converge to 1.
For an example of a length distribution/weight function
that fails these conditions, consider the (generalized) function
“expectation value” which assigns equal weight to every
length. By the weak law of large numbers (we are working
with probabilities, a fortiori finite numbers) this is
µE(m) = lim
n→∞
1
n
χZ∗n+1(m)
and hence it assigns zero weight to every single length, with
partial sums identically zero. This can be seen as the value
of a single observation, by extension any finite number of
observations, has no effect on the (infinite) direct computation
of the expectation.
We will use an elementary result in multivariate power series
in a forthcoming theorem:
Lemma 1:
Let f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∞∑
k1,...,kn=0
ck1,...,kn
n∏
i=1
(xi − x¯i)ki
be an n-variate power series centered at the point x¯ =
(x¯1, . . . , x¯n). f is identically zero in an open subset of its
area of convergence that contains x¯ if and only if f is the
zero power series.
Proof: (⇐) Trivial.
(⇒) By induction. For a univariate series identically zero on
an open interval, since the function is already a power series
and hence trivially analytic, construct the Taylor series of f
centered at x¯:
f(x) =
∞∑
n=0
f (n)(x¯)
n!
(x− x¯)n
where f (n) is the nth derivative of f . Since the function is
zero on an interval we immediately see that every derivative
evaluated at x¯ is zero and hence f , being equal to its series,
is zero.
Now consider a k+1-variate power series identically zero on
an open set containing the reference point. Pick a distinguished
variable x1, fix everything else and construct the Taylor series
of f with respect to x1 centered at x¯1:
f(x1;x2, . . . , xk+1) =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
∂nf
∂xn1
∣∣∣∣
(x¯1,x2,...,xn)
(x1 − x¯1)n
and notice that for each n (particularly n = 0) this is itself
a power series in the k variables x2, . . . , xk+1. We have that
f(x1) is the zero power series in x1 and hence each coefficient
is a zero power series in x2, . . . , xk+1, and the full f is the
zero function on k + 1 variables.
We now restrict our attention to the k = 1 case or that of
a single-state PFT. Define first a counting function to shorten
the writing a bit:
Definition 7: For an alphabet Σ, define the counting func-
tion as C : Σ+ × Σ→ N,
C(w, a) = number of occurrences of a in w
We can characterize the set of all strings indistinguishable
by any P1ST as follows:
Definition 8: Let (w, z) ∈ (Γ1 × Γ2)+, m1 ∈ Γ1 and
m2,m3 ∈ Γ2. Define the indistinguishable class [w, z]m1m2m3
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as
[w, z]m1m2m3 =
{
(x, y) ∈ Sˆn(w, z) | x ends with m1,
z ends with m2 and starts with m3
}
where Sˆn(w, z) denotes any permutation of the (modified, see
below) string pair w, z, considered as a single string over the
alphabet Γ1 × Γ2. That means the count of each character in
Γ1 × Γ2 must be the same.
Heavily abusing the notation, we force the pairs of moves
to be (O’s input, O’s output). This means that if the game is
simultaneous, then the opponent’s output occurs one turn later
in the game-centric perspective: for our purposes the string
w has to be shifted one character forward for alignment, and
the two dangling moves are not permuted. A concrete list of
examples set in Prisoner’s dilemma, starting from the string
pair w = CDCD and z = CCDD:
(a) C D C DC C D D (b)
D C C D
C C D D (c)
C D D C
C C D D
(d) D C C DC D C D (e)
C D C D
C D D C (f)
C C D D
C C D D
(a) is the original string pair, with the shift performed. (b) only
exchanges the first two characters in w and is not in the same
indistinguishable class. (c) exchanges the last two characters
in both w and z, which is an invalid transformation that also
modifies one of the dangling characters (not in the same class).
(d) exchanges the second and third columns (the dangling C
on the second row is the first column), which leaves it in the
same class. (e) exchanges the second and fourth columns, but
since the last letter of z has been changed, this is not in the
same class. (f) exchanges the third and fourth columns, and
while the column containing the last character of z is different,
z’s last character is itself unchanged and this is in the same
class.
Where m1,m2,m3 are unambiguously specified or all
triples are being considered at once, we will drop the sub-
scripts and denote the class by the shorthand [w, z]. We will
now see that no P1ST can separate two strings in the same
indistinguishable class, in the sense given in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2: For k = 1,
∀[w, z], ∀~v ∈M1, ∀(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ [w, z]
ρO1(~v)(y1, x1) = ρO1(~v)(y2, x2)
That is, every P1ST, given an indistinguishable class, must
necessarily have the same probability of outputting a string
given its corresponding input, for every string pair in the class.
Proof: Remember that a P1ST has no state information
at all (memoryless), and hence (apart from the first character)
responds identically to each character. Therefore
ρO1(~v)(z, w) =Pr(O plays z1 initially) ·
|w|∏
i=2
Pr(O plays zi given input wi)
=r∅m3
∏
m1m2∈Γ1×Γ2
rC((w,z),m1m2)m1m2
abusing wi and zi to count letters after required alignment,
where m3 is the start of z, collecting all like terms in the
parameter space. Hence if for two strings the counts are all
equal and the start characters for z are the same, then ρO1(~v)
is identical as a function of ~v.
By even more abuse of notation, for an indistinguishable
class [w, z] we will denote by ρO1(~v)[w, z] as the value of
ρO1(~v) common to all strings in the class.
IV. THEORETICAL PROPERTIES
The main result of this paper is a full characterization of the
classes of players indistinguishable under a 1-state opponent.
Theorem 3: Suppose that k = 1 and µ is nonvanishing.
Then for two players P1 and P2, FP1 ≡ FP2 as functions if
and only if
∀(w, z) ∈ (Γ1×Γ2)+, ∀m1 ∈ Γ1, ∀m2,m3 ∈ Γ2∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
ρP1(x, y) =
∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
ρP2(x, y)
That is, the total probability assigned to an indistinguishable
class is equal for both players, for each and every class.
Proof: (⇐): Remembering that FP is an absolutely
convergent series for any player P , take the function difference
FP1(~v)m1m2 −FP2(~v)m1m2
and split the combined sum across indistinguishable classes:
=
∑
all [w,z]
µ(|w|)
∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
ρO1(~v)(y, x)(ρP1 − ρP2)(x, y)
and by Lemma 2 we can factor out the response of the
opponent:
=
∑
all [w,z]
µ(|w|)ρO1(~v)[w, z]
∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
(ρP1 − ρP2)(x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by hypothesis
and hence the functions are identical over the domain M1.
(⇒): We prove its contrapositive, by showing that given
that one class has a total probability difference, FP1 6≡ FP2 .
Suppose for some m1,m2,m3 as defined in Definition 8 some
class has a total probability differential:
∃(w, z) ∈ (Γ1 × Γ2)+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
(ρP1 − ρP2)(x, y) 6= 0.
Once again split the combined sum of (FP1−FP2)(~v)m1m2
across classes:
=
∑
all [w,z]
µ(|w|) ∑
(x,y)∈[w,z]
(ρP1 − ρP2)(x, y)
 ρO1(~v)[w, z]
and now for each [w, z] we can see again from Lemma 2
that this is a unique monomial in {r∅mj , rmimj}. Since µ
and the probability differentials for each class are constants
independent of {r∅mj , rmimj}, this is now a multivariate
power series.
Invoke Lemma 1 to see that this series is identically zero
if and only if every coefficient is zero. But we know that
there is a class where the differential is nonzero, and that µ is
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nonvanishing, hence we exhibit a nonzero term in the series
for a contradiction.
The vigilant reader will have noticed that we have not
strictly fulfilled the hypotheses of Lemma 1: our implicit
reference point is ~0, which is a boundary point of the domain
M1. To remedy this, go back to the proof of Lemma 1 and
note that all that is required is for each derivative evaluated
at the point be zero. Since ~0 is a corner point in a product of
right simplices, every coordinate axis through it must have one
side inside M1. Hence every directional derivative evaluated
by approaching from M1 must be 0. Since we know it is
analytic, the derivative is equal to the limit evaluated at either
side, and is still 0.
Obviously, if µ vanishes on a length n, then any two players
can differ on their responses at move n with impunity and still
be indistinguishable, lessening the model’s power. We now
need a notion of similarity between players:
Definition 9: Call players P1 and P2 i-similar if
∀(w, z) ∈ (Γ1 × Γ2)[i], ρP1(w, z) = ρP2(w, z)
That is, their distribution-responses to the first i moves are
identical. We now have a result on approximating fingerprints,
applicable to arbitrary k, number of states in the probe:
Theorem 4: Suppose µ is regular, and {Pj}∞j=1 is a se-
quence of players with Pj being j-similar to a player P . Then
lim
n→∞FPn
uniformly−−−−−→ FP
Proof: Let  > 0, then since
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
µ(i) = 1, ∃N ∈ N∗
∣∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
µ(i) > 1− 
Now ∀i ≥ N, for an arbitrary ~v ∈ Mk, consider the
functional difference |FPi(~v)m1m2 −FP (~v)m1m2 |
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=1︸︷︷︸
i-similar
µ(n)
∑
(w,z)∈(Γ1×Γ2)n
m1m2 restrictions
ρOk(~v)(z, w)(ρPi − ρP )(w, z)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
n=j+1
µ(n)
∑
(w,z)∈(Γ1×Γ2)n
m1m2 restrictions
ρOk(~v)(z, w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum≤1
|(ρPi − ρP )(w, z)|︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum≤1
≤
∞∑
n=j+1
µ(n) < ,
shrinking the absolute value by the triangle inequality. Hence
FPi converges uniformly component-wise and therefore as a
vector function to FP .
Next we give a slightly more tractable formula that com-
putes the fingerprint of a PFT.
Theorem 5: Suppose P is a player encodable by a PFT, and
µ is regular. Then FP is an analytic function over its domain.
Proof: We start with the construction given in [13].
Denote the machine playing P by (Q1,Γ2,Γ1, δ1, q01) and
the opponent similarly with 1s swapped with 2s. Since both
players are now PFTs, we can cross-link the output of one
machine to the input of the other; recall our addition of an
initial output, which lets the system bootstrap itself. This is
simply the construction of a product automaton which now has
no input nor output: the transition probabilities from each pair
of states are now constants (for a given ~v). We also include
with the pairs of states the pair of last moves, which turns this
contraption into a first-order Markov chain as detailed below:
The Markov chain has as state space Q1 × Q2 × Γ1 × Γ2
and will be indexed by state pair and move pair. The entries
in the transition matrix T are:
Tq1q2m1m2→q′1q′2m′1m′2 = δ1(q1,m2)q′1,m′1δ2(q2,m1)q′2,m′2
that is, the transition requires the events that both P and O
decide to shift states and output correctly. Then, the fingerprint
can be seen to be
FP (~v)m1m2 =
〈
χm1m2
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=1
µ(n)Tn−1
∣∣∣∣∣ q01 ⊗ q02
〉
where the last term is the tensor product vector of the
initial state/output distributions for both players, and χm1m2
is abusively the indicator vector that is 1 if the state-move pair
indexed has move m1m2 and zero otherwise. The entry is in
the form of a real inner product.
Notice that the n = 1 term is simply the initial distributions,
and each subsequent move has one power of the transition
matrix multiplied on; the sum weighted by µ has all the
components that have last move m1m2 lifted out, as per the
definition of the fingerprint operator.
Finally, it is obvious that for any finite n, we have that Tn
has polynomial entries. Since µ is regular, we use the same
trick in Theorem 4, from the boundedness of entries in Tn,
to see that the fingerprint, as a uniform limit of a series of
polynomials, is itself analytic.
Example computations can be found further on in Section
V. With this theorem, we can show that the fingerprint
functions are highly well-behaved, being analytic (infinitely
differentiable and equal to its power series) and hence Lip-
schitz continuous (since differentiable, equivalent to having
a bounded derivative). These results only hold for players
which are actually possible: the specification may include such
absurdities as ρ(m1,m2) = 0 with ρ(m1m1,m2m2) > 0.
Corollary 6: Suppose µ is regular, then for a possible
player P , FP is analytic over its domain.
Proof: Given a player P that follows the laws of prob-
ability, we can construct a PFT that is k-similar to it by
simply listing all move sequences up to length k as states
in a prefix tree and constructively assigning the transition and
output probabilities to match P ; further moves are irrelevant.
By Theorem 5 we see that the fingerprint of any PFT is
analytic, and by Theorem 4 we have that the fingerprint of
P is the uniform limit of a sequence of fingerprints of PFTs,
each an analytic function, and thus analytic.
Corollary 7: Suppose µ is regular, then for a possible
player P , FP is Lipschitz continuous over its domain. The
precise definition is
∃C ∈ R | ∀x, y ∈Mk, ‖FP (x)−FP (y)‖ ≤ C ‖x− y‖ .
Proof: We already know that FP is analytic over the
domain, so it can be expressed as a Taylor series in any
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basis about any point in the domain, hence F ′P is finite for
any direction at any point. Obviously we also have ‖F ′P ‖
continuous, and since the domain Mk, being a product of
simplices, is compact, ‖F ′P ‖ attains a maximum on it and
hence F ′P is bounded. Therefore
‖FP (x)−FP (y)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∫ x
y
F ′P (s)ds
∥∥∥∥ ≤ C ‖x− y‖
where both the integral and the derivative are in the direction
of y − x (remember the simplices are by definition convex)
and C is the bound on ‖F ′P ‖, by the fundamental theorem of
calculus and the mean value theorem.
With this, we can prove a final, and even more powerful
corollary. Recall the definition of uniform continuity of a
function f : X → Y as
∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 | ∀x, y ∈ X,
‖x− y‖X < δ ⇒ ‖f(x)− f(y)‖Y < ,
or a single δ() bound works for every point in the domain.
Lipschitz continuity strengthens this statement by requiring
that δ be at least linear in . For a set of functions, the notion
of uniform equicontinuity extends this to all functions in the
set at once.
Corollary 8: If µ is regular, then the k-state fingerprints
of all PFTs with at most j states, Pj , form a uniformly
equicontinuous set over their common domain. The precise
statement is
∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 | ∀P ∈ Pj , ∀x, y ∈Mk,
‖x− y‖ < δ ⇒ ‖FP (x)−FP (y)‖ < ,
a single bound works for every point, for every fingerprint
simultaneously.
Proof: We have parametrized the k-state opponent; since
we are now considering all PFTs with at most j states, we
shall parametrize them as well. Let Pj(~u) be the parametrized
player with parameter space M′j similarly defined as
M′|Q| = ∆(Q× Γ1)×∆(Q× Γ1)|Q×Γ2|.
Again construct the Markov chain for the product automaton
with the same form of transition matrix, and conclude that
the infinite sum-inner product form of the fingerprint holds.
Repeat the rest of the proof for Theorem 5: the partial sums are
bounded polynomials in all the parameters; µ regular implies
that the partial sums converge uniformly to the fingerprint,
which is hence analytic in every parameter.
Finally, the analogous proof from Corollary 7 shows that the
set of bounded-state PT fingerprints is equi-Lipschitz, although
such a characterization is uncommon. A fortiori, they form a
uniformly equicontinuous set.
V. EXAMPLES AND COMPARISON
Prior work in this field has mostly been concerned with
investigating Prisoner’s Dilemma playing agents [12], [13],
[14], [15]. For such a two-move game, and for k = 1, we
can specify O1 with three parameters: x is the probability
of cooperating initially, y is the probability of cooperating in
response to a cooperate, and z is the probability of cooperating
in response to a defect. Recall the identification of ∆
({C,D})
with [0, 1].
For actually computing the fingerprint, we have to specify
the length distribution µ: a choice that satisfies both the
nonvanishment and regularity conditions is the geometric
distribution:
µα(n) = (1− α)αn−1, α ∈ (0, 1).
More importantly, in [27] it is proved that computing the
geometrically weighted matrix power series can be done easily
with ∞∑
i=0
M i = (I −M)−1,
the direct matrix analogue of the geometric sum. True to
that, the convergence condition requires that the matrix have
eigenvalues in (−1, 1). Since the construction in Theorem 5
produces a Markov chain, it is column-stochastic and hence
has spectral radius 1, which after scaling with α is strictly less
than 1: the theorem applies. Hence the fingerprint of the PFT
P with µα is
FP =
〈
χm1m2
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=1
(1− α)(αT )n−1
∣∣∣∣∣ q01 ⊗ q02
〉
= (1− α)χTm1m2(I − αT )−1(q01 ⊗ q02)
with T the transition matrix as defined in Theorem 5.
This is computable in the time to invert a matrix multino-
mial, which is at most O(dmn3+m) where m is the number
of variables and d is the maximum degree of entries, by
inverting the matrix at sufficient points in an m-dimensional
grid and interpolating. Each inversion takes O(n3), and since
the entries in the inverse are (2n−1) bounded-degree rational
expressions of the entries in the input matrix (which are
themselves polynomials in the variables), O(dn) points are
required per dimension.
For our purposes m = kG2(kG1 + 1) and d = 3 (product
of α, the initial move and output distribution for the opponent,
all linear), hence 6n− 2 points to invert at per dimension are
sufficient by brute force.
A. Display Details
We display fingerprints of Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies as
they are conceptually easier to understand, as well as in line
with previous work [13], [14], [15]. We will use the space
[0, 1]3 to represent M1.
Since x, the probability of initially cooperating, affects
things once, we can see that the fingerprint function is linear
in it; hence two points suffice to completely determine it: we
will conveniently choose x = 1 (cooperate initially) and x = 0
(defect initially).
In forthcoming figures, we will depict the yz-plane from
y = 0 (bottom) to y = 1 (top), and z = 0 (left) to z = 1
(right). Recall also that the output of the fingerprint function
is a probability vector over the pairs of moves: there are 4
dimensions, but one is redundant since they sum to 1, which
conveniently fits in the RGB color model.
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CC CD DC DD Composite
x=1
x=0
Fig. 1. Fingerprint panels for TFT “Tit-for-tat” (cooperate initially, return opponent’s last move) at α = 0.8, see Subsection V-A for more detail
The figures displayed have 10 panels; the upper row is for
x = 1 and the lower row x = 0. In each row, the first panel
(green) shows the probability of CC (both cooperate), linearly
from 0 7→ (0, 0, 0) RGB to 1 7→ (0, 1, 0). The second panel
(white) shows the probability of CD (player P cooperates,
opponent probe defects), linearly from 0 7→ (0, 0, 0) to
1 7→ (1, 1, 1). The third panel (blue) shows Pr(DC) (player
P defects, opponent probe cooperates) linearly from 0 7→
(0, 0, 0) to 1 7→ (0, 0, 1); the fourth panel (red) shows Pr(DD)
(both defect) linearly from 0 7→ (0, 0, 0) to 1 7→ (1, 0, 0).
The last panel is a composite that adds the colors from the
green, blue and red panels, (Pr(DD),Pr(CC),Pr(DC)) RGB;
the white panel is ignored, so the darker the color, the more
CD occurs.
The geometric µ defined in the previous section will be the
one of choice; the value α = 0.8 is chosen for most of the
figures arbitrarily. The “mean” of the distribution is 11−α , and
not to give undue weight to the initial move, α close to 1 is
preferred.
B. Tit-for-Tat Computation
As an example, we will compute the fingerprint of the
famous strategy tit-for-tat (cooperate initially, return the op-
ponent’s last move thereafter). Following the construction
in Theorem 5, we impute a Markov chain to the product
automaton as follows:
11CC 11CD 11DC 11DD
11CC y 0 z 0
11CD 1− y 0 1− z 0
11DC 0 y 0 z
11DD 0 1− y 0 1− z
Where the Markov states are labelled (TFT’s state, probe’s
state, TFT’s last move, probe’s last move). Call this matrix T .
The fingerprint with geometric µ is given by:
FTFT;m1m2 = χTm1m2(I4 − αT )−1

x
1− x
0
0
 ,
where the indicator vectors are given by χCC = e1, χCD =
e2, χDC = e3, χDD = e4, the standard basis vectors.
Intermediate calculations are omitted; the four component
functions are given in the next column.
The astute reader may notice that the choice of ei, the
natural basis vectors, for the initial move vector corresponds
to fixing the initial move from both automata; computing the
fingerprint of a variant of TFT that defects first move is as
simple as replacing that vector with (0, 0, x, 1 − x)T . In this
sense we have computed the fingerprint of all possible choices
of initial moves (and states) from both players.
FTFT;CC =
x
(
1− α(1− z))+ α2(z − x)((1− α)y + αz)(
1 + α(z − y))(1 + α2(z − y))
FTFT;CD =
(
1− α(1− z))((1− x) + α(x− y))(
1 + α(z − y))(1 + α2(z − y))
FTFT;DC =
α
(
(1− α)y + αz)((1− x) + α(x− y))(
1 + α(z − y))(1 + α2(z − y))
FTFT;DD =
α
(
(1− y)(1− x) + α(x− y)(1− y))(
1 + α(z − y))(1 + α2(z − y))
The reader should also verify that limα→0+ removes de-
pendence on y, z as we have µ = χ{1} and hence responses
do not matter; limα→1− removes dependence on x as we are
now specifying µ = µE, the expected value, and hence initial
move does not matter. Also verify that this second limit, with
the parameter substitution derived further on in Section V-E,
reduces the function to the one given in [13]. This fingerprint
function, evaluated at α = 0.8, is displayed in Figure 1.
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x

· · · ONMLHIJKCC+4yoo
1−y

ONMLHIJKCC
+3
yoo
1−y

ONMLHIJKCC
+2
yoo
1−y

ONMLHIJKCC
+1
yoo
1−y

ONMLHIJKDC
+0
zoo
1−z

ONMLHIJKDC
-1
zoo
1−z

ONMLHIJKDC
-2
zoo
1−z

ONMLHIJKDC
-3
zoo
1−z

· · ·zoo
· · ·
1−y
//ONMLHIJKCD
+3 1−y
//
y
OO
ONMLHIJKCD
+2 1−y
//
y
OO
ONMLHIJKCD
+2 1−y
//
y
OO
ONMLHIJKCD
+0 1−y
//
y
OO
ONMLHIJKCD
-1 1−y
//
y
OO
ONMLHIJKDD
-2 1−z
//
z
OO
ONMLHIJKDD
-3 1−z
//
z
OO
ONMLHIJKDD
-4 1−z
//
z
OO
· · ·
1−x
OO
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the Markov chain construction for computing the fingerprint of Majority. States are labelled Majority’s last move, probe’s
last move as well as current cooperations minus defects.
Fig. 3. Approximate fingerprints for Majority truncated at 4 (top), 16 (middle)
and 256 (bottom) moves, with the geometric distribution at α = 0.8
C. Majority Computation
Majority is the strategy that returns the move the opponent
used more, breaking ties in favor of cooperation. This requires
unbounded memory and hence this is not implementable as a
finite state machine. While the result of Corollary 6 shows that
it is analytic for reasonable µ, actually computing it is another
matter. The result of Theorem 5 gives a theoretically feasible
way: construct a sequence of automata that play identically to
majority for the first n moves, compute their fingerprints and
take the limit. We will use an equivalent approach (minus the
limit).
Consider the product automaton used for computing finger-
prints between an infinite state machine that plays majority
Fig. 4. Approximate fingerprints for 8192-move truncated Majority with the
geometric distribution at α = 0.9 (top), 0.98 (middle) and 0.995 (bottom)
and the one-state probe automaton. A schematic representation
of the Markov chain extension is shown in Figure 2. The
states are labelled with a pair of last moves and a number,
which counts cooperation minus defects from the opponent;
the probe’s state is never in question.
We may truncate this Markov chain with a finite bound on
the number allowed as states. If the bound is ±n, then it takes
at least n moves to reach the end. Truncating the infinite sum
definition of the fingerprint at the same bound, we get:
FMajority ≈ (1− α)χTm1m2
(
n∑
i=1
(αT )n−1
)
(q01 ⊗ q02).
This is conceptually a “strategy” that plays as majority up
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to the nth move then flatly refuses to play - yet this is still
n-similar to majority.
To compute this, we may track the probability mass as it
runs through the truncated Markov chain and hence directly
compute T kqi for k = 0, . . . , n−1. Results for α = 0.8 for
n = 4, 16, 256 are shown in Figure 3. A bound on the absolute
error in terms of the probability mass omitted is αn+1 and
hence the sequence converges linearly in the number of states.
The bound is on the order of 10−25 at n = 256, negligible.
To illustrate the result in [12] that majority’s expected value
fingerprint is discontinuous, we vary α from 0.9, 0.98, 0.995
in Figure 4 to 0.999 in Figure 5. To keep the error bound
reasonably low, we increase n to 8192, giving the largest error
at 0.9998193 ≈ 10−4. Notice the sharpening corner at the point
y = z = 0.5.
The observant reader may have noticed that unlike TFT,
whose fingerprint function becomes independent of x as µ
approaches the expected value, here the x = 0 and x = 1
tracks seem to converge towards something different. This is
a consequence of the proof in [12] that shows the fingerprint
“type” depends on the relative probability that the Markov
chain diverges towards +∞ or −∞. In the region where
y ∈ (0.5, 1], z ∈ [0, 0.5) (opponent plays close to TFT), the
“equilibrium point” about 0 is unstable and the initial move
tips the balance irrevocably towards one mode of divergence
over another. This shows another defect in using the expected
value: while one may expect that for an automaton with no
transient states initial moves do not matter and can be ignored,
in some infinite cases it may still have permanent effects!
D. Catalogue of Simple Strategies
A selection of simple strategies is fingerprinted and dis-
played all with geometric µ at α = 0.8. In the top half:
“Always cooperate” (ALLC, Figure 6a) never defects and
hence its DC/DD panels are empty, likewise with “Always
defect” (ALLD, Figure 6b) and its CC/CD panels. Compare
“Tit-for-tat” (TFT, Figure 1) and “Psycho” (Figure 6c): their
composite panels are approximately reverses. “Random” (Fig-
ure 6d) has differences in color since the opponent does
not always play randomly. “Periodic CD” (Figure 6e) and
“Periodic DC” (Figure 6f) are distinct, owing to the geometric
distribution emphasizing earlier moves: Periodic CD is closer
to the ALLC fingerprint.
In the bottom half: “Pavlov” (Figure 6g) and “Fortress-2”
(Figure 6h) play exact reverses of each other, but interestingly
in expected value their fingerprints match - here they are dis-
tinguishable. Fortress-2 also has its cooperative side revealed
by forcing an initial defect from the probe. This is limited
however, and “Fortress-3” (Figure 6j) shows a fingerprint close
to ALLD. These two are examples of a handshake or password
strategy - to activate their cooperation, you have to play the
password (a defect or two defects). “Vengeful” (Figure 6i)
plays like Always defect if the opponent defects first; while
continued mutual cooperation can persist. “Tit-for-two-tats”
(Figure 6l) is a more forgiving variant of TFT, while “Two-
tits-for-tat” (Figure 6k) is more vengeful, and it shows.
E. Comparison
A comparison with work by Ashlock and Kim [14]: their
fingerprinting model focuses on first specifying the finite state
strategy and then adding random noise to it, while this model
starts at a probabilistic finite machine and goes on from there.
Their fingerprint using the strategy TFT as a probe can be
computed as follows:
FTFT(P, x, y) = E(score of P against JA(TFT, x, y))
the expected score of playing against a parametrized opponent.
JA(TFT, x, y) is, if x+y ≤ 1: plays cooperate with probabil-
ity x, defect with probability y and as TFT would otherwise;
if x + y ≥ 1: plays cooperate with probability 1 − y, defect
with probability 1 − x and the reverse of what TFT would
otherwise.
This is a lengthy definition, but we can try and reparametrize
it in terms of P1ST parameters (x′, y′, z′). If x + y ≤ 1,
the probability of initially playing cooperate is if the machine
picks either randomly or to follow TFT: x′ = x+(1−x−y) =
1−y; the probability of cooperating in response to a cooperate
is either random or as TFT: y′ = 1 − y; and cooperation in
response to a defect can only occur randomly: z′ = x. If x+
y ≥ 1, the initial cooperation can only be random: x′ = 1−y;
cooperation in response to a cooperate is also random-only:
y′ = 1−y; cooperation in response to a defect is either random
or as reverse-TFT: z′ = 1− y+ (1− (1− y)− (1− x)) = x.
Hence in the entire unit square, we have that
JA(TFT, x, y) = O1(1− y, 1− y, x)
and we get immediately the proof at [13] that this fingerprint
is a continuous extension of the same function in the x+y ≤ 1
triangle to the entire unit square. We see that using TFT
as a probe is a two-dimensional subspace of the full P1ST
parameter space, omitting an independent variable for the
initial move; similarly using a k-state strategy gives a 2-
dimensional subspace of Mk. Also instead of outputting a
probability vector of move-pairs, they use it to compute a
score, reducing it to a real-valued function.
Since their model is subsumed into this one, with µ being
the expectation value, this new model is a strict generalization
of theirs. Additionally, recall that expectation fails both nonva-
nishment and regularity, conditions for some of the theorems.
Recall [12] where the strategy Majority is shown to have a
discontinuous fingerprint, illustrated in Figure 5.
VI. METRICS AND STRUCTURE OF DFT-SPACE
One application of the fingerprinting method is to investi-
gate how distinct strategies differ from one another, and by
extension how different representations sample the space of
players. Recall from Definition 1 that the set of distributions
supported on a n-element set is isomorphic to the surface of
the n−1-simplex. This gives us a natural way of equipping it
with a measure:
Definition 10: Let S be a finite nonempty set with |S| = n.
Let (∆(S),ΣS , pin) be the probability space defined with:
pin(X) =
(n− 1)!√
n
λn−1
(
P (X)
)
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Fig. 5. Approximate fingerprint for 8192-move truncated Majority with the geometric distribution at α = 0.999
Where P : ∆(S) → Rn−1 is an appropriate projection that
is a Euclidean isometry on ∆(S) considered as a subset of
(Rn, d2), and λn−1 is the standard Lebesgue measure in n−1
dimensions. The measurable subsets ΣS are just the preimages
under P of the Lebesgue measurable sets in Rn−1, ΣRn−1 , that
lie completely in the range P (∆(S)):
ΣS = P
−1
(
ΣRn−1 ∩ P
(
P (∆(S))
))
.
This convoluted definition is just a mathematically precise
way of stating that the measure of some subset of the surface
of the n−1-simplex is found by projecting it onto a base,
which is a solid n−2-simplex (for example, the unit regular
tetrahedron is projected onto the solid unit right triangle), and
finding its n−1-hyperarea.
Note that unlike a usual probability space, this one has
elements in its state space that are themselves distributions.
The normalizing factor is the reciprocal of the n−1-hyperarea
of the n−1-right simplex. Recall that we identified ∆(Z2)
with [0, 1], the latter obviously having measure (length) 1. The
reader can easily verify that(
∆(Z2),ΣZ2 , pi2
) ∼= ([0, 1],ΣR ∩ P([0, 1]), λ1)
as measure spaces. With a measure in hand, we can repro-
duce the (normalized) L2 or Euclidean distance between two
functions:
Definition 11: Let k and µ be given. Define a metric
d2 : P × P → R, where
d2(P1, P2) =
√∫
Mk
‖FP1 −FP2‖22 dµMk , with
dµMk = d
kG1+1pikG2 .
That this is a metric (and even a norm; all fingerprints
trivially have norm 1) follows immediately from L2 being a
metric (and norm), since we have only scaled it by a constant.
By inspection we can see that the maximum distance is
√
2
since ‖FP1 −FP2‖22 is bounded above by 2. The attainable
maximum is less than that since the opponent will not always
respond with a definite move.
A. Separation of Variables
Although the fingerprints have complex dependencies on
the parameters for responses, they are linear in the initial
parameters. Hence this part of the fingerprint can be separated
out to reduce the dimension a bit. Rewrite the fingerprint for
player P as the linear combination
FP (~s, ~r) =
∑
q∈Q
∑
m3∈Γ2
r∅qm3fP ;q,m3(~r)
where ~s, ~r are the initial state/move and response parameters
respectively. Now rewrite the definition of L22 as
∫
∆(Q×Γ2)
∫
Rk
∥∥∥∥∑
q∈Q
∑
m3∈Γ2
r∅qm3(fP1;q,m3 − fP2;q,m3)(~r)
∥∥∥∥2
dpikG2 dµRk
where Rk is the parameter space for responses and µRk its
associated measure. Split the squared norm into a sum over
components:
=
∑
m1∈Γ1
m2∈Γ2
∫
∆(Q×Γ2)
∫
Rk
(∑
q∈Q
∑
m3∈Γ2
(fP1 − fP2)q,m3(~r)m1m2
r∅qm3
)2
dpikG2 dµRk ,
next double the inner sums to get rid of the square:
=
∑
m1∈Γ1
m2∈Γ2
∫
∆(Q×Γ2)
∫
Rk
(∑
q1∈Q
q2∈Q
∑
m3∈Γ2
m4∈Γ2
(fP1 − fP2)q1,m3(~r)m1m2
(fP1 − fP2)q2,m4(~r)m1m2
r∅q1m3r∅q2m4
)
dpikG2 dµRk ,
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(a) ALLC “Always cooperate” (always cooperate) (b) ALLD “Always defect” (always defect)
(c) PSY “Psycho” (defect initially, return the reverse of opponent’s action) (d) RAND “Random” (cooperate with probability 1/2 on every move)
(e) perCD “Periodic CD” (repeat the sequence of moves C,D) (f) perDC “Periodic DC” (repeat the sequence of moves D,C)
(g) PAV “Pavlov” (cooperate initially, then if both players’ last moves match) (h) FRT2 “Fortress-2” (defect until opponent defects, then continue cooper-
ating with cooperation, else reset)
(i) VNGFL “Vengeful” (cooperate until opponent’s first defection, defect
thereafter)
(j) FRT3 “Fortress-3” (defect until opponent defects twice in a row, then
continue cooperating with cooperation, else reset)
(k) 2TFT “Two-tits-for-tat” (defect if opponent has defected in either of the
last two moves)
(l) TF2T “Tit-for-two-tats” (defect if opponent has defected in both of the
last two moves)
Fig. 6. A selection of simple strategies, fingerprinted with geometric µ at α = 0.8. The abbreviated names for each strategy are given in boldface.
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which allows us to complete the separation of variables:
=
∑
m1m2
∑
q1q2
∑
m3m4
(∫
∆(Q×Γ2)
r∅q1m3r∅q2m4 dpikG2
)
(∫
Rk
(
(fP1 − fP2)q1,m3(fP1 − fP2)q2,m4
)
(r)m1m2 dµRk
)
.
The quadratic integral can be easily calculated. Since the
simplices are symmetric under any exchange of variables, there
are only two cases depending on if (q1,m3) = (q2,m4). If so,
call that variable x and the number of variables kG2 = n, and
project the surface of the right n-simplex into the solid right
n−1-simplex, which scales it by 1/√n. Write the integral as
(n− 1)!
∫ 1
0
x2
∫
N(Q×Γ2\{x};1−x)
1 dσn−2 dx
where dσn−2 is the unscaled measure on n − 2 dimensions
and N(Q × Γ2\{x}; 1 − x) is the solid n−2-right simplex
with variables in Q × Γ2\{x} of side length 1 − x, whose
hypervolume scales as the n−2th power of length:
= (n− 1)!
∫ 1
0
x2
1
(n− 2)! (1− x)
n−2 dx,
and substitute y = 1− x:
= (n− 1)
∫ 1
0
(1− y)2yn−2 dy = 2
n(n+ 1)
.
If not, call the two variables x, y, project the surface
similarly and write the integral as
(n− 1)!
∫ 1
0
x
∫ 1−x
0
y
∫
N(Q×Γ2\{x,y};1−x−y)
1 dσn−3 dy dx
and similarly the n−3 dimensional hypervolume scales as the
n−3th power:
= (n− 1)!
∫ 1
0
x
∫ 1−x
0
y
1
(n− 3)! (1− x− y)
n−3dy dx,
and perform the change of variables (x, y) 7→ (x, z = 1−x−y)
of Jacobian -1:
= (n− 1)(n− 2)
∫ 1
0
x
∫ 1−x
0
(1− x− z)zn−3 dz dx
= (n− 1)(n− 2)
∫ 1
0
x
(1− x)n−1
(n− 2)(n− 1) dx,
and substitute y = 1− x:
=
∫ 1
0
(1− y)yn−1dy = 1
n(n+ 1)
,
which can be made the same as the equal case by merging the
terms for x, y and y, x.
Hence we have the reduced formula for the distance com-
putation as
d2(P1, P2) =
2
kG2(kG2 + 1)
∑
m1m2
∑
(q1,m3)≤(q2,m4)(∫
Rk
(
(fP1 − fP2)q1,m3(fP1 − fP2)q2,m4
)
(r)m1m2 dµRk
)
for some arbitrary ordering of Q × Γ2; m1 ∈ Γ1, m2 ∈ Γ2,
q1, q2 ∈ Q, m3,m4 ∈ Γ2.
B. Approximation
Even if k = 1 and µ is geometric, exactly computing the
distances between fingerprints is very difficult: to illustrate,
the distance between TFT and ALLC as computed by the
Maple mathematical package, and hand simplified beyond the
capability of both Maple and MATLAB, is
d2(TFT,ALLC;µα)2 =
1
45α6(α− 1)3
(
α4(α− 1)(15α6
− 45α5 + 226α4 − 425α3 + 487α2 − 288α+ 102)− (α10
− 20α9 − 20α8 − 100α7 + 110α6 − 82α5 − 110α4 + 340α3
− 515α2 + 330α− 78) ln(α+ 1)− (7α10 + 40α9 − 110α8
+ 390α7 − 690α6 + 1080α5 − 1190α4 + 1060α3 − 695α2
+ 330α− 78) ln(α2 + 1)− (α− 1)5(45α4 − 15α5 + 15α3
+ 35α2 + 60α+ 78) ln(1− α))
with ln denoting the natural logarithm. Both time and com-
plexity constraints preclude analytical computation for all but
the simplest strategies, hence an approximation to the distance
is needed. A simple grid over the unit square will suffice,
however an estimate of the error is needed.
Recall Corollary 8 which proves equicontinuity for the set of
j-state automaton fingerprints. What we need here is a bound
on the common Lipschitz constant for the set. Again use the
inner product definition of the fingerprint with geometric µ,
define A = (I − αT ) and derive with respect to y (also z):
∂FP ;m1m2
∂y
= (1− α)χTm1m2
∂
∂y
(
A−1
)
(q01 ⊗ q02)
since q01 does not depend on y. Using the formula
dA−1(t)
dt =
−A−1 dA(t)dt A−1 (proved by A−1 = 2A−1 − A−1AA−1) and
taking the norm we get∣∣∣∣∂FP ;m1m2∂y
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣(1− α)χTm1m2A−1 ∂∂y (A)A−1(q01 ⊗ q02)
∣∣∣∣
which with linearity of the matrix norm with respect to
the vector norm, submultiplicativity and the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality becomes
≤ (1− α) ‖χm1m2‖1
∥∥A−1∥∥2
1
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂yA
∥∥∥∥
1
‖q01 ⊗ q02‖1 .
Since the last vector is a probability vector its 1-norm is
1. The χ vector has exactly j entries of 1 and hence has
1-norm j. Recall from the definition of T to see that the
partial derivatives have absolute sum 2 (the entire column may
contain at most y and 1−y in combination), hence the partials
of A have 1-norm 2α. In [27] it is proved that the 1-norm of
A−1 is 11−α . Putting this together gives
= (1− α)(j) 1
(1− α)2 (2α)(1) =
2jα
1− α .
Call this bound Ly and notice that it diverges as j → ∞ or
α→ 1−. An identical bound works for the partial with respect
to z: Lz = 2jα1−α .
For the partials with respect to x, only q01 depends on it,
so the norm-derivative becomes∣∣∣∣∂FP ;m1m2∂x
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣(1− α)χTm1m2A−1 ∂∂x (q01 ⊗ q02)
∣∣∣∣ ,
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again after manipulation of the norms and inner products
≤ (1− α) ‖χm1m2‖1
∥∥A−1∥∥
1
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂x (q01 ⊗ q02)
∥∥∥∥
1
.
Again the partial of q with respect to x has absolute sum 2,
giving
= (1− α)(j) 1
1− α (2) = 2j.
Call this bound Lz . We will however not need this bound as
we have separated out the x variable and computed it exactly.
Finally, take the full distance function and express it as:
d2(P1, P2)
2 =
1
3
∑
m3≤m4
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∑
m1m2
(∆fm3)(∆fm4) dy dz
with ∆fm being shorthand for (fP1;m − fP2;m)(r)m1m2 .
Analyze one double integral as follows. Let the functional
differences (∆fm) be approximated by (∆fm + δm). Expand
the product to get∑
m1m2
(∆fm3+δm3)(∆fm4 + δm4)− (∆fm3)(∆fm4) =∑
m1m2
δm3(∆fm4) + (∆fm3)δm4 + δm3δm4
and restrictions can come in. |∆fm| ≤ 1 since they are
differences of probability vectors;
∑
m1m2
δm = 0 since we
approximate with points on the function. There are 3 m3m4
components and we can bound those additively. Hence we
have a bound on the error of the integrand
 ≤ 12δmax + 6δ2max
and the error in the entire integral is bounded by
|∆d2(P1, P2)| ≤
√∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
4δmax(y, z) + 2δmax(y, z)2 dy dz .
Suppose we divide the unit square into an n × n evenly
spaced grid of squares and sample at midpoints. From the Lip-
schitz constant computed earlier, the bound is δmax(x, y, z) =
‖(Lxδx, Lyδy, Lzδz)‖2 where (δx, δy, δz) is the vector dis-
tance to the nearest grid point. Since δx = 0 as we do not
need to sample x, and Ly = Lz we now have δmax(y, z) =
Ly ‖(δy, δz)‖2. Plug into the integral for a single square:∫ xi+1
xi
∫ yl+1
yl
4δmax(y, z) + 2δmax(y, z)
2 dy dz
= 4
∫ 1
2n
0
∫ 1
2n
0
4Ly ‖(y, z)‖2 + 2L2y ‖(y, z)‖22 dy dz.
The squared term is easy to compute:
= 4
∫ 1
2n
0
∫ 1
2n
0
2L2y(y
2 + z2) dy dz = 8L2y
∫ 1
2n
0
z2
2n
+
1
24n3
dz
=
L2y
3n4
.
The linear term naturally is moved to polar coordinates:
= 4(4Ly)
(∫ √2
2n
0
∫ pi
2
0
rr dθ dr − 2
∫ √2
2n
1
2n
∫ sec−1( r2n )
0
rr dθ dr
)
// ?>=<89:;A '' ?>=<89:;Bff Cyclic: color = 12A+ 12B
// ?>=<89:;A // ?>=<89:;B
UU
Sink 1: color = 14A+
3
4B
// ?>=<89:;A // ?>=<89:;B
UU
Sink 2: color = 16A+
5
6B
// ?>=<89:;A '' ?>=<89:;Bff Trigger 1: color = 23A+ 13B
// ?>=<89:;A '' ?>=<89:;B
UUff
Trigger 2: color = 13A+
2
3B
// ?>=<89:;A '' ?>=<89:;B
UUff
Other: color = gray
Fig. 7. Types of 2-state automata classified by transition graphs alone. A
and B refer to strategies as played by that state disregarding transitions, and
their assigned colors.
where sec−1 is the arcsecant function, by overintegrating the
quarter circle to radius
√
2× and subtracting off the excess.
The first portion of this is simple:
=
∫ √2
2n
0
pi
2
r2 dr =
pi
2
1
3
(√
2
2n
)3
=
pi
12
√
2n3
After scaling r by 2n, the extraneous part becomes:
= 2
∫ √2
1
1
2n
( r
2n
)2
sec−1(r) dr =
1
4n3
∫ √2
1
r2 sec−1(r) dr
which can be seen after some calculus to be
=
1
4n3
1
3
(√
2(pi − 1)− ln(1 +
√
2)
)
.
The entire linear term is now
= 16Ly
1
12
√
2n3
(
pi −
√
2(
√
2(pi − 1)− ln(1 +
√
2)
))
=
2
√
2
(
2− pi +√2 ln(1 +√2))Ly
3n3
.
Lastly, since there are n2 squares, the entire error bound is
|∆d2(P1, P2)| ≤√
4j2α2
3(1− α)2n2 +
4
√
2jα
(
2− pi +√2 ln(1 +√2))
3(1− α)n .
This error is linear in j, diverges asO( α1−α ) and onlyO(n−
1
2 ).
The extra work to tighten the bound is because of this
divergence in α which cannot be easily removed.
C. Experimental Design
As the space of deterministic finite state automata with given
input and output alphabets and bounded states forms one of the
basic finite sets of “computing machinery”, we will investigate
its structure as a simple example of actually applying this
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Fig. 8. Number of clusters found for data computed at 4 different α values
against cutoff value.
model in practice. The idea is to transform each member of
this set into a function and do some analysis on the resultants.
We will consider the fingerprints of all 2-state DFTs for
playing Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nominally, there are 29 of them,
the binary choices being initial move, and transition and output
for both inputs for both states. However, if the automaton
is to have a 2-state minimal representation then restrictions
appear, such as the second state has to be accessible, and
the two states play different strategies from the 1-state list
{ALLC,ALLD,TFT,PSY}. There are 296 automata under
complete playing equivalence, 8 of which are the 1-state
automata.
Each automaton is fingerprinted with the standard 1-state
probe, and all pairwise distances computed approximately with
a grid of 4096 × 4096 points over the unit square, sampled
at midpoints and calculated in a binary divide-and-conquer
fashion to reduce floating-point error. α ranges in intervals of
0.05 from 0 to 0.5, then in intervals of 0.02 from 0.5 to 0.9,
then in intervals of 0.005 from 0.9 to 0.995, and at 0.99999999,
a total of 51 points.
Standard statistical analysis techniques are employed to
interpret the data, including k-means multiclustering [12] and
principal components analysis [28].
Recall that standard k-means clustering is stochastic, de-
pending on the choices of initial clusters. For such little data
one single run of k-means gives unacceptably large uncer-
tainty. Hence k-means multiclustering is used. This runs k-
means many times for some distribution of cluster number and
outputs a [0, 1] similarity matrix based on the frequency data
points i, j are found in the same cluster. Reinterpreting that as
a weighted graph, we may construct a clustering algorithm by
removing edges below a cutoff value and calling connected
components clusters. Raising the cutoff and removing more
edges can only split current clusters; hence it is hierarchical.
D. Results and Discussion
The error bounds computed in Section VI-B give values of
0.0098 at α = 0.5, 0.0299 at α = 0.9, 0.1126 at α = 0.99
and 56382 at α = 1− 10−8. The last bound is worthless and
all data from that frame may well be meaningless, apart from
observed continuity.
Figure 8 shows the results of the k-means multiclustering.
The data for α = 0.1, 0.5, 0.8, 0.99 are clustered 1000000
times each with uniformly random initial cluster centers, the
number of such picked from a distribution which is 2 plus a
geometric distribution of p = 0.1 truncated at 148, yielding a
range of [2, 150] clusters.
Notice that the 0.1 data has evenly spaced steps from 3 to 9
then a long flat region, indicating 9 important clusters with
unequal spacing. Above that larger jumps occur indicating
equal spacing amongst parallel subclusters. The 0.5 data has
4 important clusters, two of which are much closer than the
other two, and splits into a cloud of equally spaced subclusters
around cutoff 0.6 and has no further structure. The 0.8 data has
two clusters, which decomposes into 9 lesser clusters, which
in turn have little substructure. The 0.99 data has 2-5 major
clusters and no other significant level of structure.
Principal components analysis was run using MATLAB
software for each of the α values individually, as well as for
all 51 frames concatenated. This introduces significant bias
towards higher α in representation, but subsampling evenly
makes little change to the results.
In the following figures all 296 automata are plotted at once:
to give some clarity a coloring scheme was introduced. The
special 1-state automata are plotted as follows: ALLC in green,
ALLD in red, TFT in blue, PSY in black. Some of the 2-state
automata can be considered to “interpolate” between 1-state
strategies and are given colors to match. Cyclic automata are
given a color halfway between the two strategies played. Sink
automata are given a color 3/4 or 5/6 of the sink depending
on if it is possible to stay in the transient state. The last
class of automata recognizable are those that have one state
always transition to the other (for our purposes called “trigger”
automata): these are given 1/3 of the color of the lesser
state, and further desaturated halfway to gray. The rest of the
automata are plotted in gray. Figure 7 shows illustrations of
all types.
Figure 9 shows the first 3 principal components for the
automata, tracked across α and projected onto the α-dependent
bases. Notice the continuity of the components as the distance
is analytic; this procedure is an approximation to functional
principal components analysis where the basis vectors are
allowed to be functions.
The bottom graph shows the fraction of variance outside the
first 1-5 principal components. It is easy to see that as α→ 0
the data become 1-dimensional and 1 component suffices. The
observed corner in the 3 components line near α = 0.75 is
due to a shift in the order of eigenvalues, and similarly another
shift occurs around α = 0.85. The “third” principal component
shown here is the one from α close to 1; below 0.75 it is the
fourth component. No reordering of the first two components
occurs.
The first principal component is the single dimension near
α = 0, namely initial move, cooperate or defect. Close to
α = 1 we can see that ALLC and ALLD-type strategies
are separated while TFT/PSY-types have 0 coordinate - this
can be called “cooperativeness” in the sense of bias towards
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one move or another. The other two components have 0
coordinates near α = 0 as expected for 1-dimensional data.
The second component as α → 1 separates the pairs of
strategies ALLC/ALLD and TFT/PSY - this can be loosely
called “responsiveness” to the opponent. The third component
zeros ALLC and ALLD while separating TFT and PSY -
loosely this is “coordination”, whether the response is equal
or opposite to the opponent’s move.
Loadings for the various principal components have been
omitted since the symmetry of the distance matrices means
the loadings are just variance-normalized negatives of the
coordinates.
To show the difference between functional PCA and normal
PCA with concatenated data, the first 4 coordinates of the
automata in concatenated PCA are shown in Figure 10. Notice
the similarity between PCA component 1 with the α = 0 end
of FPCA component 1, PCA component 2 with the α = 1
end of same, PCA component 3 with FPCA component 2,
and PCA component 4 with FPCA component 3. Hence as
α varies, the automata move from a 1-dimensional subspace
to a mostly orthogonal 3-dimensional subspace. These 4
components account for 0.958 of the variance.
The 3-dimensional parametric plots of all automata under
FPCA basis are shown in Figure 11, along with all 3 planar
projections. The array of points as α → 1 can be compared
with the k-means results at α = 0.99: the various points are
separated into unequally spaced clusters, and beyond a certain
cutoff will split into many subclusters quickly.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper details many aspects of a novel model for finger-
printing game playing agents, including theoretical properties
and limitations, computational details and examples of single-
player display as well as representation-wide studies. It is
shown that finite automata can be fingerprinted in polynomial
time in the number of states, and the universal approximability
of logically consistent players by automata allows uniform
estimation of even non-finite state strategies. Basic analysis
of the 2-state deterministic automata reveals that 3 principal
components are enough to separate the 8 1-state automata but
leave coalesced small subclusters of “similar” strategies in the
limit of using the expected value distribution.
Theorem 3 completely partitions the space of move histories
into indistinguishable classes, but finding distinct pairs of
strategies with identical fingerprints and simple encodings is
difficult. Asymptotically the number of degrees of freedom
for an arbitrary player outstrips the number of restrictions to
achieve functional identity and hence there should be many
players that have a given fingerprint. Usual encodings incor-
porate a finite number of parameters, so it will be interesting
to see how many nontrivial pairs exist for some representation.
For example, 2-state finite automata have duplicates, but they
are all copies of 1-state automata and are hence trivial.
And whilst the distinguishing power of the 1-state probe
is easily found, an analogous proof method for k > 1 will
encounter substantial difficulties. To see this, the response
function ρO2(~v)(z, w) can be shown to be the solution of the
recurrence relations
q(i+ 1) = s11wiq(i) + s12wi
(
1− q(i)), q(0) = ∑
m2∈Γ2
r∅1m2
p(i+ 1) = r1ziwiq(i) + r2ziwi
(
1− q(i)),
p(0) = r∅1w0 + r∅1w1 , ρO2(~v)(z, w) =
|z|∏
i=0
p(i)
where sijm2 is the probability of transitioning from state j to
state i seeing m2 as input. q(i) is the probability of being in
state 1 at move i and p(i) is the probability of playing move
i as dictated. This will not be a monomial in the parameters,
hence to use the same proof orthogonalization is required, and
the indistinguishable classes become linear combinations.
The application presented here is on figuring out timescale
(per α) dependence of the structure of a representation; this
can obviously be done for other classes of strategies, for
example in [16], [17]. Other questions that can be posed
include the mutational connectivity network of the representa-
tion, interrelation of the structure of different representations,
change in structure when a score matrix is introduced and so
forth. However all these are for a static assessment of a single
state space, which must necessarily be small or computation
required becomes huge.
Given that one of the original motivations for this work
was to automate analysis of evolutionary game theory, all
aspects of the field can be re-interpreted through the oft-
more convenient lens of functions. One direction is to consider
the impact of parameters on the population dynamics. These
include representation, algorithm choice, parameters of the
algorithm, population size and time (explored in [18]), and
changes in the game such as different scoring or noise. A
concept usable here is of population statistics: this can be
easily extracted from a set of functions, and allow nontrivial
quantification of phenomena such as evolutionary velocity
(change of average) and population diversity (variance).
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